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analysis to include 14 European countries in the estimations.  Our results again indicate that the United 
States has the highest tax morale across all countries, followed by Austria and Switzerland.  We also 
find a strong negative correlation between the size of shadow economy and the degree of tax morale in 
those countries.  
 
 
JEL Classification: H260; H730 
Keywords: Tax Morale; Tax Compliance; Tax Evasion; Culture 
 
                                                 
∗ James Alm, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, 
University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083 USA (phone 404 651-0420; fax 404 651-4985; email jalm@gsu.edu).  
Benno Torgler, International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University, University Plaza, Atlanta, GA 30303-3083, USA; University of Basel, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches 
Zentrum (WWZ), Basel (Switzerland); and CREMA, Center for Research in Economics, Managementand the 
Arts (Switzerland) (email ecobtx@langate.gsu.edu and benno.torgler@unibas.ch).  We are grateful to Doris Aebi 
and participants of the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society 2004 in Baltimore, especially Daniel R. 
Arce, Stephen Knack, Christopher Westley, and Mario Ferrero, for helpful comments and discussions of a 
previous version.  Financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years much research has investigated whether values, social norms, and 
attitudes differ across countries and whether these differences have measurable effects on 
economic behavior.  One area in which such studies are particularly relevant is tax 
compliance, given both the noted differences across countries in their levels of tax compliance 
and the marked inability of standard economic models of taxpayer compliance to explain 
these differences.  Tax compliance seems to depend upon numerous factors beyond the 
standard economic ones of deterrence, and, given the level fines and audit rates in most 
countries (in combination with available estimates of risk aversion), deterrence models predict 
far too much compliance and far too little tax evasion (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; 
Frey and Feld, 2002).  Elffers (2000) points out that “...the gloomy picture of massive tax 
evasion is a phantom”.  Long and Swingen (1991) argue that some taxpayers are “...simply 
predisposed NOT to evade“, and thus do not even search for ways to cheat at taxes (Frey and 
Foppa, 1986).  Pyle (1991, 173) criticises the assumption that individuals are amoral utility 
maximisers: “Casual observation suggests that not all individuals think quite like that... 
indeed, it seems that whilst the odds are heavily in favour of evaders getting away with it, the 
vast majority of taxpayers behave honestly”. 
In the face of these difficulties, many researchers have suggested that the intrinsic 
motivation for individuals to pay taxes – what is sometimes termed their “tax morale” – 
differs across countries; that is, if taxpayer values are influenced by cultural norms, with 
different societal institutions acting as constraints and varying between different countries, 
then tax morale may be an important determinant of taxpayer compliance and other forms of 
behavior.  However, isolating the reasons for these differences in tax morale is notoriously 
difficult. 
In a common approach, studies sometimes referred to as “cultural studies” have often 
relied upon controlled laboratory experiments conducted in different countries because such 
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experiments can be set up with identical experimental protocols to allow cultural effects to be 
isolated.  For example, Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995) compared identical tax compliance 
experiments conducted in Spain and the United States, two countries with very different 
cultures and histories of compliance.  They found that subjects in the United States 
consistently exhibited higher compliance than subjects in identical experiments in Spain, and 
attributed these differences to a higher “social norm” of compliance in the United States.  
However, while informative, the use of experimental methods to investigate tax morale is 
limited by the ability to conduct such experiments in numerous countries. 
In this paper we further investigate whether tax morale differs in these two countries 
and beyond using empirical methods that allow us to estimate for many countries the 
determinants of tax morale at the individual level.  We first analyze a cross-section of 
individuals in Spain and the United States using the World Values Survey (WVS) data 
because it seems likely that survey data on Spain and the United States should show a similar 
picture as the experimental results.  In line with the experiments, our findings indicate a 
significantly higher tax morale for individuals in the United States than for those in Spain, 
controlling in a multivariate analysis for additional variables.  We then extend our 
multivariate analysis to include individuals in 14 European countries in the estimations.  Our 
results again indicate that the individuals in the United States have the highest tax morale 
across all countries, followed individuals in Austria and Switzerland.  We also find a strong 
negative correlation between the size of shadow economy and the degree of tax morale in 
those countries.  
 In the next section we briefly discuss previous cross-country findings, and introduce 
the concept of tax morale.  In section III we present our empirical results, first on Spain versus 
the United States and then on the full sample of European countries.  In section IV we finish 
with some concluding remarks.  
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II. “CULTURAL” STUDIES IN ECONOMICS 
In economics, there is often a lack of empirical and experimental evidence on the 
effects of culture.  In the specific area of tax compliance, cross-culture studies are especially 
new, and most existing work is found in the experimental literature.  Laboratory experiments 
are able to hold relevant tax-reporting factors constant, and so are able to better isolate 
possible culture differences.  As noted earlier, Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995) use 
experimental methods to explore the role of social norms in Spain and the United States.  In 
addition, Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, and Torgler (2004) combine experimental 
and survey data from the United States, Botswana, and South Africa to investigate whether 
cross-cultural differences can explain tax compliance behavior across these countries.  Their 
results indicate that the observed differences in tax compliance behavior and tax morale can 
be explained by differences in the fairness of tax administration, in the perceived equity of the 
fiscal exchange, and in the overall attitude towards the respective governments across the 
countries. 
There are also some experimental results in other economic research areas, especially 
behavioral economics.  However, the findings show a mixed picture.  Ockenfels (1999) and 
Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) perform public good and solidarity experiments in East and 
West Germany, and find differences in cooperation and solidarity, with East Germans less 
cooperative than West Germans.  In contrast, Torgler (2003a) compares the tax morale of 
inhabitants of East and West Germany after the post-reunification period using the World 
Values Survey data for the years 1990 and 1997.  He finds that inhabitants of East Germany 
have a higher tax morale than those of West Germany in both years, but also that the tax 
morale in the East seems to erode over time.  Similarly, Mummert and Schneider (2002) 
report a significantly lower share of shadow economy labor in East Germany than in West 
Germany. 
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In other work, Heinrich et al. (2001) undertake a large cross-cultural experimental 
study of behavior using ultimatum, public good, and dictator games, and find a large variation 
across the different cultural groups.  They argue that preferences and/or expectations are 
affected by group-specific conditions such as institutions or cultural fairness norms.  Botelho, 
Harrison, Hirsch, and Ruström (2001) reconsider previously conducted experiments on 
bargaining behavior in different cultures.  They find that there are differences among cultures 
but that the differences strongly interact with demographic characteristics of participants.  
Ashraf, Bohnet, and Piankov (2003) analyze trust in investment games, dictator games, and 
risky choice tasks in Russia, South Africa, and the United States, and they find that 
reciprocity seems to drive Americans’ trustworthiness, while in Russia and South Africa 
trustworthiness is related to kindness.  Experimental findings of Brandts, Saijo, and Schram 
(2003) on voluntary contributions to public goods in different countries (e.g., Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United States) do not find any cultural differences.  
 In general, the disparate findings suggest that a substantial body of evidence is needed 
to get a general idea of the impact of societal institutions in economics.  Robustness can also 
be analyzed using different methodologies for the same question, and, if the alternative 
methods show the same tendencies, then we can suppose that the results are robust.  In the 
next section, we return to the issue of tax morale and tax compliance, and we present a variety 
of empirical estimates of the determinants of tax morale that indicate clear cross-cultural 
differences. 
 
III. ESTIMATING THE DETERMANTS OF TAX MORALE 
 1. The Concept of Tax Morale 
While some preliminary tax morale research was conducted during the 1960s by the 
“Cologne school of tax psychology” (Schmölders, 1970; Strümpel, 1969), the concept of tax 
morale has largely been neglected by tax researchers.  A number of contemporary tax 
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compliance scholars have mentioned the concept of tax morale in their papers or books 
(Lewis, 1982; Vogel, 1974), but only a select few have examined tax morale in any detail.  
Feld and Frey (2002) point out that: 
“…most studies treat ’tax morale’ as a black box without discussing or even 
considering how it might arise or how it might be maintained. It is usually perceived 
as being part of the meta-preferences of taxpayers and used as the residuum in the 
analysis capturing unknown influences to tax evasion. The more interesting question 
then is which factors shape the emergence and maintenance of tax morale”. 
 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by identifying cultural (and other) factors that have an 
impact on tax morale. 
Recall that we have defined “tax morale” as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. The 
World Values Survey (WVS) allows us to analyze tax morale as a dependent variable.  The 
survey is a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change collecting 
comparative data on values and belief systems among people around the world.  It is based on 
representative national samples of at least 1000 individuals in a country, and has been 
conducted somewhat erratically over time in more than 40 countries.  All surveys are done via 
face-to-face interviews at the respondents’ homes and in their respective national languages.  
The sampling design consists of a multi-stage, random selection of sampling points with a 
number of points being drawn from all administrative regional units, after stratification by 
region and by degree of urbanization.  The survey results can be weighted variable to 
represent national population parameters.1  
Because the WVS asks the identical question to respondents in the various countries, 
the survey allows cross-country (and cross-year) comparisons of societal attitudes toward 
religion, culture, and, especially for our purposes, tax compliance.  The general question to 
assess the level of tax morale from the WVS is: 
“Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: ..... Cheating on tax if you have 
                                                 
1  For a comprehensive discussion of the WVS, see Inglehart et al. (2000). 
 5
the chance (% “never justified” – code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1=never and 
10=always).” 
 
The dependent variable TAX MORALE is developed by recoding the ten-point scale into a 
four-point scale (0 to 3), with the value 3 standing for “never justifiable”.  The value of 0 is an 
aggregation of the last 7 scale points, which were rarely chosen.   
 
2. Tax Morale in Spain and the United States 
We estimate separately the determinants of TAX MORALE at the individual level for 
the combined United States and Spain data set over two different time periods, 1990 and 
1995, although we report only the results for 1990.2  The analysis of two time periods helps 
give us a relatively robust picture of the levels of tax morale in Spain and the United States 
and the determinants that shape tax morale in the countries, especially whether statistically 
significant differences between both countries can be found.  For each year, we include a 
separate dummy variable SPAIN, equal to 1 if a WVS respondent is a resident of Spain and 0 
if otherwise.  As suggested by the experimental results of Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995), 
our expectation is that residents of Spain will, other things equal, exhibit a lower TAX 
MORALE than residents of the United States.  We estimate all specifications using ordered 
probit methods, with a weighting variable on all observations to adjust the data to reflect the 
national distribution.  The ordered probit models allow us to analyze the ranking information 
of the scaled dependent variable TAX MORALE.  To obtain the quantitative impacts of the 
explanatory variables, we calculate the marginal effects of each variable. 
Table 1 presents the results for 1990; the results for 1995 are similar and are not 
reported here.3  We report a large number of alternative specifications, and all specifications 
show the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the highest value “Tax evasion is 
never justified”. 
                                                 
2 These data fit into the time during which the experiment of Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995) was conducted. 
3  All results are available upon request. 
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The variable of most interest is SPAIN.  The estimated coefficient on SPAIN is 
negative and highly significant across all specifications, and indicates that tax morale is 
significantly higher in the United States than in Spain.  The marginal effects indicate that 
being from Spain rather than from the United States reduces the probability of stating that tax 
evasion is never justified by around 9 percentage points in 1990.4  Thus our findings show 
that tax morale is unambiguously higher in the United States, though with a tendency for 
some decline in the differences during the observed five years.  
To investigate whether the difference between Spain and the United States is largely 
driven by higher trust in the United States, we include several trust variables together with the 
SPAIN dummy variable in the same equations (see equations 1 to 4 in Table 1).  In a general 
way, it can be argued that positive actions by the state are intended to increase taxpayers’ 
positive attitudes and commitment to the tax system and thus to compliant behavior (Smith, 
1992; Smith and Stalans, 1991).  If the state acts in a trustworthy way, then taxpayers might 
be more willing to comply with the taxes.  We use two trust variables, or TRUST IN LEGAL 
SYSTEM and TRUST IN PARLIAMENT, which are available for both countries (and both 
years) to check the robustness of the trust variables.  These variables allow us to analyze trust 
at the constitutional level (e.g., trust in the legal system), thereby focusing on how the 
relationship between the state and its citizens is established; they also allow us to analyze trust 
more closely at the current politico-economic level (e.g., trust in the parliament).  In all 
estimations both trust variables have a significantly positive effect on tax morale; that is, an 
increase in trust in the legal system or in parliament by one unit raises the share of persons 
indicating the highest tax morale by more than 3 percentage points. 
Also robust across all specifications is the positive correlation between TAX 
MORALE and religion.  Religiosity might influence people’s habits, and might be a 
restriction to engage in tax evasion.  As the religious variable, we use the variable frequency 
                                                 
4  Similarly, the estimated coefficient on SPAIN for the 1995 estimates is negative and highly significant, with 
an impact on tax morale of roughly one-half its impact in 1990. 
 7
of CHURCH ATTENDANCE, which measures how much time individuals devote to 
religion.  Empirical studies have tended to show that states and counties with higher rates of 
religious attendance and memberships have significantly less violent and non-violent crime 
(Hull, 2000; Hull and Bold, 1989; Lipford, McCormick, and Tollison, 1993).  Thus, our result 
is in line with previous studies. 
As for other variables, we observe that a higher financial satisfaction leads to a higher 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes.  Financial dissatisfaction might create a sense of distress, 
especially when taxes have to be paid, and so might increase the incentive to cheat on one’s 
taxes.   Marital status might influence legal or illegal behavior depending on the extent to 
which individuals are constrained by their social networks (Tittle, 1980), and such a constraint 
might affect tax morale.  However, it should be noticed that this variable might interact with 
the tax system, and differences in the degree of tax morale might be based on different tax 
treatments of married and non-married people.  Evidence from the United States and Spain in 
Table 1 indicates that married people have a higher tax morale than singles.  
We also include additional variables that attempt to proxy for income.  The income 
variable is scaled differently in Spain and in the United States, so that a direct measure of 
income cannot be included.  However, we have included variables in which people had to 
self-classify themselves in different income groups (e.g., LOWER CLASS, WORKING 
CLASS, LOWER MIDDLE CLASS, UPPER MIDDLE CLASS, UPPER CLASS).  In 
general, a higher economic class is correlated with a lower tax morale, and the marginal 
effects increase with an increase in the class.  Also, women and older individuals tend to 
exhibit a higher TAX MORALE, but these coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Overall, then, our estimation results in Table 1 for 1990 (and similar but unreported 
results for 1995) consistently indicate that there the TAX MORALE in Spain is significantly 
lower than in the United States. 
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 Table 1. Determinants of Tax Morale in Spain and the United States (1990) 
Weighted Ordered Probit Coefficient t-ratio Marginal
Effect 
Coefficient t-ratio     Marginal
Effect 
Coefficient t-ratio Marginal
Effect 
Coefficient t-ratio Marginal
Effect 
 (1)    (2) (3) (4)
Independent Variables             
 
Culture Variable             
SPAIN          -0.260*** -0.098-8.021  -0.246*** -7.531 -0.093 -0.226*** -6.959 -0.086 -0.248*** -7.207 -0.094
 
Demographic Factors             
AGE 0.011***          11.493 0.004 0.011*** 11.388 0.004 0.011*** 11.156 0.004 0.011*** 11.119 0.024
WOMAN            0.021 0.826 0.008 0.016 0.631 0.006 0.026 1.024 0.010 0.035 1.349 0.004
 
Marital Status             
MARRIED            0.129*** 4.204 0.049 0.133*** 4.359 0.050 0.117*** 3.755 0.044 0.123*** 3.809 0.010
LIVING TOGETHER -0.038 -0.679 -0.014 -0.035 -0.623 -0.013       -0.031 -0.558 -0.012 -0.035 -0.568 0.046
DIVORCED           -0.110* -1.830 -0.042 -0.101* -1.667 -0.038 -0.100 -1.621 -0.038 -0.116* -1.821 -0.014
SEPARATED          -0.144* -1.928 -0.054 -0.149** -1.987 -0.056 -0.158** -2.144 -0.060 -0.154** -2.009 -0.045
WIDOWED            0.112* 1.865 0.042 0.111* 1.845 0.042 0.104* 1.717 0.040 0.074 1.169 -0.065
 
Employment Status             
PARTTIME EMPLOYED -0.044 -1.220 -0.017          -0.046 -1.270 -0.017 -0.076** -2.092 -0.029 -0.015 -0.405 0.020
SELFEMPLOYED          -0.130* -1.767 -0.049 -0.132* -1.787 -0.050 -0.101 -1.326 -0.038 -0.132* -1.739 -0.011
UNEMPLOYED            0.065 1.395 0.024 0.049 1.055 0.019 0.043 0.901 0.016 0.040 0.809 -0.050
AT HOME 0.125*** 2.758 0.047 0.115** 2.543 0.043 0.122*** 2.671 0.046 0.090* 1.900 0.001 
STUDENT            0.031 0.578 0.012 0.043 0.802 0.016 0.002 0.035 0.001 0.056 1.016 0.034
RETIRED            0.032 0.748 0.012 0.022 0.513 0.008 0.019 0.419 0.007 0.004 0.079 0.030
OTHER          -0.376*** -0.142-3.804  -0.412*** -4.219 -0.156 -0.405*** -4.083 -0.154 -0.750*** -5.320 0.000
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Economic Situation             
FINANCIALSATISFACT            0.022*** 4.489 0.008 0.022*** 4.521 0.008 0.018*** 3.653 0.007 0.025*** 4.870 -0.306
UPPER CLASS             -0.193*** -3.630 -0.055
UPPER MIDDLE CLASS             -0.134*** -2.903 -0.039
LOWER MIDDLE CLASS             -0.034 -0.775 -0.004
 
Religiosity             
CHURCH ATTENDANCE            0.043*** 7.377 0.016 0.040*** 6.874 0.015 0.040*** 6.682 0.015 0.047*** 7.655 0.019
 
Trust              
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM             0.091*** 6.565 0.034 0.081*** 5.668 0.034
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT             0.140*** 9.766 0.053
 
Number of observations 5592         5592 5460 5233 
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     
Notes: The dependent variable is TAX MORALE, measured on a four-point scale (0 to 3, with 3 being the highest tax morale).  In the reference 
group for all dummy variables are MAN, SINGLE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, WORKING CLASS (no observations for the LOWER CLASS), 
and USA. The Marginal Effect is calculated at the highest TAX MORALE score (or 3). 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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2. United States and Europe 
There are few studies that systematically analyze tax morale in different nations.  
Weck (1983), Weck, Pommerehne, and Frey (1984), and Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) 
developed a “tax immorality” index, and found a higher tax immorality in Romanic countries 
like France, Italy, and Spain compared to other European countries.  Kirchgässner (1999) 
argues that in the northern states of Europe (in contrast to the majority of Catholic countries in 
the south) state and religious authority were held by one person.  Offenses against the state 
were therefore also religious offenses and consequently a sin. 
With the World Values Survey wave 1990-1993, we have the possibility of combing a 
large number of European countries into an empirical study using multiple regression 
analysis.  As with the Spain-United States estimation, we include country dummy variables 
using the United States as the reference (and omitted) group.  This allows us to determine 
whether there are differences in TAX MORALE between the United States and European 
countries.  Using a single question also has the advantage that problems like complexity that 
are associated with the construction of an index can be reduced, especially regarding the 
measurement procedure or a low correlation between the items.  However, in cross-cultural 
comparisons single item measures should be treated with some caution.  In countries where 
tax revenues are collected to finance a “dictator’s war machine”, for example, tax evasion 
might be justifiable, and there could even be a “moral duty” not to pay taxes.  Similarly, in 
authoritarian political systems people will search for “voice” or “exit” mechanisms via tax 
resistance to express their preferences (Torgler, 2001).  As Europe and United States can be 
seen as relatively homogeneous, OECD countries, such problems are likely reduced.  In a 
further estimation we differentiate between Romanic and Northern Countries with a dummy 
variable excluding the United States to check whether previous findings with data from the 
 11
1960s and 1970s (e.g., Weck, 1983) can be confirmed.5  Data from a later World Values 
Survey in 1995-1997 do not allow such a comparison, as a smaller number of European 
countries have participated.  To maximize the number of countries in the estimations, some 
previously used control variables in the United States and Spain estimations have been 
excluded.  Table 2 presents the results.  
 
Table 2. Tax Morale in Europe and in the United States 
 Weighted Ordered Probit Coefficient t-ratio
Marginal
Effect Coefficient t-ratio
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient t-ratio
Marginal 
Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Independent Variables    
 
Countries           
AUSTRIA -0.084 -1.881 -0.034 -0.083 -1.859 -0.033    
BELGIUM -0.884*** -19.679 -0.352 -0.893*** -19.588 -0.356    
DENMARK -0.111** -2.849 -0.044 -0.124** -3.169 -0.049    
FINLAND -0.536*** -15.132 -0.214 -0.535*** -15.043 -0.213    
FRANCE -0.471*** -12.380 -0.188 -0.468*** -12.237 -0.187    
GERMANY -0.254*** -6.282 -0.101 -0.256*** -6.296 -0.102    
GREAT BRITAIN -0.279*** -7.035 -0.111 -0.282*** -7.053 -0.112    
IRELAND -0.549*** -14.271 -0.219 -0.544*** -14.086 -0.217    
ITALY -0.288*** -5.719 -0.115 -0.292*** -5.774 -0.116    
NETHERLANDS -0.545*** -15.209 -0.217 -0.565*** -15.674 -0.225    
NORWAY -0.527*** -12.877 -0.210 -0.530*** -12.893 -0.211    
PORTUGAL -0.689*** -19.359 -0.275 -0.672*** -18.795 -0.268    
SPAIN -0.227** -3.080 -0.090 -0.223*** -2.983 -0.089    
SWEDEN -0.120** -2.997 -0.048 -0.128** -3.199 -0.051    
SWITZERLAND -0.076 -1.772 -0.030 -0.107* -2.469 -0.043    
 
Demographic Factors          
AGE 0.011*** 22.717 0.004 0.011*** 21.714 0.004 0.011*** 22.266 0.004 
FEMALE 0.236*** 20.944 0.094 0.240*** 21.093 0.096 0.251*** 21.834 0.100 
 
Marital Status          
MARRIED 0.060*** 3.884 0.024 0.056*** 3.623 0.023 0.042** 2.639 0.017 
LIVING TOGETHER -0.181*** -8.288 -0.072 -0.180*** -8.179 -0.072 -0.175 -7.819 -0.070 
DIVORCED -0.009 -0.345 -0.004 0.002 0.078 0.001 0.024 0.865 0.010 
SEPARATED -0.125** -2.824 -0.050 -0.110* -2.483 -0.044 -0.138** -2.906 -0.055 
WIDOWED 0.067* 2.342 0.027 0.074* 2.572 0.030 0.076 2.621 0.030 
 
Employment Status          
                                                 
5 Italy, France, Portugal and Spain have been defined as Romanic countries; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Germany as Northern countries.  
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PART TIME EMPLOYED -0.070*** -3.372 -0.028 -0.065*** -3.103 -0.026 -0.080*** -3.927 -0.032 
SELFEMPLOYED -0.160*** -6.133 -0.064 -0.164*** -6.257 -0.066 -0.146*** -5.470 -0.058 
UNEMPLOYED -0.060* -2.258 -0.024 -0.041 -1.529 -0.017 -0.047 -1.698 -0.019 
AT HOME -0.036 -1.944 -0.015 -0.033 -1.760 -0.013 -0.063*** -3.458 -0.025 
STUDENT -0.054* -2.265 -0.021 -0.067** -2.817 -0.027 -0.108 -4.457 -0.043 
RETIRED 0.054** 2.657 0.022 0.060** 2.895 0.024 0.034 1.671 0.014 
OTHER -0.066* -2.150 -0.026 -0.062 -1.994 -0.025 -0.060 -1.921 -0.024 
 
Economic Situation          
FINANCIAL 
SATISFACTION    0.018*** 8.065 0.007 0.019*** 8.666 0.008 
 
Religious Variable          
CHURCH  ATTENDANCE 0.048*** 16.555 0.019 0.046*** 15.728 0.019 0.041*** 14.875 0.016 
 
Culture          
ROMANIC       -0.045*** -3.688 -0.018 
 
Observations 25695   25410   23720   
Prob(LM-statistic) 0.000     0.000     0.000     
Notes: The dependent variable is TAX MORALE, measured on a four-point scale 0 to 3, with 3 being the 
highest tax morale).  In the reference group for all dummy variables are MAN, SINGLE, FULL TIME 
EMPLOYED, USA, and NORTHERN COUNTRIES.  The Marginal Effect is calculated at the highest 
TAX MORALE score (or 3).  To get an equal number of weighted observations (around 1500) for each 
survey, the original weight variable was multiplied by a constant for each country. 
Significance levels: * 0.005 < p < 0.010, ** 0.001< p < 0.005, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
As indicated in Table 2, we observe that the United States has the highest tax morale 
among all countries.  Only Switzerland and Austria show coefficients that are not significant 
or on the border of significance with marginal effects between 3 and 4 percentage points.  
Countries such as Portugal or Belgium indicate the strongest differences compared to the 
United States, with marginal effects around 30 percentage points. It is interesting to observe 
the high tax morale of the United States and Switzerland, two countries with a strong direct 
democratic tradition.  Taxpayers are treated as “citizens” with extensive rights and obligations 
(Frey 2003).  The possibility for taxpayers to vote on fiscal issues might influence tax morale. 
Being involved in the political decision process enhances taxpayers’ sense of civic duty (Feld 
and Frey, 2002) and thus their tax morale.  The instrument of direct democracy helps spend 
taxes according to their preferences, and the motivation to contribute paying their taxes may 
increase.  Our results are in line with previous findings.  For example, Pommerehne and 
Weck-Hannemann (1996) use cross-section/time series regressions with Swiss data, and they 
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find that tax evasion is lower in cantons with a higher degree of direct political control.  
Torgler (2003b) also finds with Swiss survey data that a higher direct democracy leads to a 
higher tax morale.  Feld and Frey (2002) analyze how tax authorities treat taxpayers in 
Switzerland, and find that tax authorities of cantons with more direct participation rights, 
compared to cantons with less direct democracy, treat taxpayers more respectfully, are less 
suspicious if taxpayers report too low incomes, and more heavily fine unsubmitted tax 
declarations.  Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999) and Feld and Tyran (2002) use 
experimental methods, and show that voting on tax issues has a positive effect on tax 
compliance.  
 The estimation in specification (3) in Table 2 is also consistent with previous findings. 
People from Northern Europe have a significantly higher tax morale than people from 
Southern Europe.  The marginal effects indicate that being from a Romanic country rather 
than from Northern Europe reduces the probability of stating that tax evasion is never justified 
by 1.8 percentage points.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A significant body of research on tax compliance has been accumulated.  Much work 
has concentrated on traditional topics, such as the impact of audit, penalty, and tax rates on 
compliance.  However, there is overwhelming evidence that observed tax compliance 
behavior cannot be explained entirely with the traditional economic analysis that focuses 
mainly on deterrence components.  Instead, there are several other factors that help explain 
why many people are compliant, especially the notion of “tax morale”.  Our focus in this 
paper is on social and institutional factors.  We conduct a cross-country comparison of tax 
morale with World Values survey data.  Tax morale, or the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, 
might be a solution to the puzzle why so many individuals pay their taxes.  Interestingly, this 
factor until now has mostly been discussed as a residual explanation without investigating 
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factors that shape tax morale.  By analyzing tax morale as a dependent variable, we hope to 
fill a large gap in the tax compliance literature.  
 Using data from the World Values Survey, we first find strong evidence consistent 
with previous experimental results of Alm, Sanchez and De Juan (1995), who demonstrated 
that subjects in laboratory economic experiments in the United States consistently exhibited 
higher compliance than subjects in identical experiments in Spain.  In our estimation results, 
individuals in the United States have a statistically significant higher tax morale than those in 
Spain, controlling in a multivariate analysis for additional factors.  The marginal effects were 
quite high.  We believe that these estimation results are consistent with a higher “social norm” 
of compliance in the United States than in Spain. 
We then extend our multivariate analysis to include further 14 European countries in 
the estimations.  Our results show that individuals in the United States have the highest tax 
morale across all countries, followed those in Austria and Switzerland.  The high tax morale 
values in the United States and in Switzerland might indicate that strengthening the direct 
democratic elements helps increase tax morale.  Such institutional and political methods may 
enhance the identification and the loyalty with the state based on an active participation role 
in the political process expressing their preferences.  Our results also indicate a higher tax 
morale in Northern European countries than in Romanic countries. 
A relevant issue is whether these clear differences in tax morale across countries are 
reflected in any differences in real, or observed, behaviors in these countries.  One area in 
which tax morale might be expected to have such real effects is in the size of the informal or 
shadow economy.  The number of countries (16) used in Table 2 allows us to exploit TAX 
MORALE at the aggregated level (e.g., using averages among countries) to analyze the 
simple correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy.  The size of the 
shadow economy is measured as a percent of official GDP, using the estimates of the shadow 
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economy from Schneider and Klinglmair (2003).6  Figure 1 shows that there is a strong 
negative correlation (Pearson r=-0.567) significant at the 0.05 level.  Analyzing the linear 
relationship in a simple regression indicates that the variable tax morale can explain more 
than 20 percent of the total variance of the variable size of shadow economy.  Thus, the 
degree of tax morale has consequences for real behavior, and might be responsible for the size 
of shadow economy.7 
 
Figure 1. Tax Morale and the Size of Shadow Economy 
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 Notes: Au: Austria, Be: Belgium, De: Denmark, Fi: Finland, Fr: France, Ge: Germany, 
GB: Great Britain, Ir: Ireland, It: Italy, Ne: Netherlands, No: Norway, Po: Portugal, Sp: 
Spain, Sw: Switzerland, Swe: Sweden, US: USA.   
 
                                                 
6  See also Schneider and Enste (2002) for a detailed description of the DYMIMIC and currency demand 
approaches that are used. 
 
7  We also examined simple correlation coefficients between tax morale and a number of additional variables, 
such as total tax revenues as a percent of GDP, per capita total tax revenues, and the shares of the major taxes in 
total tax revenues or in GDP.  Although these correlations were generally of the expected signs (e.g., tax morale 
was negatively correlated with total tax revenues as a percent of GDP), they were seldom statistically significant. 
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In summary, our results indicate that tax morale differs significantly and 
systematically across countries.  Our results also indicate that such differences seem likely to 
have real effects, and in particular may help explain the size of shadow economy in the 
countries analyzed in this paper.  Further investigation of the determinants – and the resulting 
effects – of tax morale is called for. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1. Derivation of Some Variables in the World Values Survey 
Variable Derivation 
TAX MORALE Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. Cheating on tax 
if you have the chance (4=never and 1=always)  
CLASSES People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the 
middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as 
belonging to the: 
1. Upper class 
2. Upper middle class 
3. Lower middle class 
4. Working class 
5. Lower class 
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the parliament: is it a great 
deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none 
at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all) 
TRUST IN LEGAL SYSTEM Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: is it a 
great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or 
none at all? (4= a great deal to 1=none at all) 
FINANCIAL SATISFACTION How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (scale 1 = 
dissatisfied to 10=satisfied) 
Source: Inglehart et al. (2000).
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